

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 18, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
J. J. McConnell, Deputy Technical Director
FROM: R. T. Davis/ T. D. Burns
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending June 18, 2004

Staff members F. Bamdad, J. Contardi, M. Duncan, M. Moury, B. Rosen, and J. Plaué were on-site this week reviewing the SRS salt processing strategy and the status of the Salt Waste Processing Facility.

Safety Basis Documents: During a Facility Evaluation Board review at FB-Line in March 2004, the team noted that two different versions of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Supplement were present in the control room. The WSRC Nuclear Safety Section had also noted issues with the correct version of safety basis documents on the site intranet. Based on these indicators, WSRC initiated a site wide review to assess the control of DOE approved safety basis documents. The review team completed their initial evaluation this week. The team identified ten additional failures to properly control safety basis documents at facilities across the site.

WSRC has now initiated a 100% line-by-line inspection to ensure that the DOE approved safety basis document is available in Document Control. In addition, the review team will ensure the controlled copies (e.g., those located within facilities) are identical to the DOE approved document. This review should be complete by the end of this month. WSRC and DOE-SR are also developing corrective actions to ensure adequate configuration control is maintained for these safety basis documents.

Building 235-F: Early this year, WSRC identified a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis for Building 235-F based on the potential for a forklift impact that would result in a pressurized release of material from a 9975/3013 package configuration. Last week, WSRC completed the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) analysis for this accident scenario. The analysis concludes that a USQ does exist based on the increased frequency for this accident and the increase of potential off-site dose consequence. However, the dose consequence does not approach the values that would require safety basis coverage. WSRC is developing procedural controls to reduce the potential for a forklift impact. These controls will be discussed in the next revision of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA).

Plutonium Surveillance: This week, DOE-SR approved the DSA addendum for Limited Extent Surveillance (LES) of plutonium packages (i.e., 9975 shipping packages/DOE-STD-3013 containers) in Building 235-F. LES will provide interim capability to receive and non-destructively evaluate plutonium packages until WSRC completes the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability (CSSC) project in Building 235-F. LES will also provide the capability to overpack problem containers to meet the Interim Safe Storage Criteria. For the CSSC project, WSRC has developed a recovery schedule now that funds have been reprogrammed (site rep weekly 5/28/04). WSRC expects to complete conceptual design for this project in November 2004. The preliminary DSA has been submitted to DOE-SR.